POLISH EXHIBITION IN BLAIRGOWRIE.

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CO SLYCHAC

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Z drukiem niniejszego numeru mieliśmy nielada kłopoty. Na dwa dni przed terminem telefon: dzwoni Drukarnia, że oryginały zaginęły na kolei. L. N. E. R. poszukuje przesyłki na całej przestrzeni między Perth a Aberdeen, gdzie jest oddział drukarni. Daremnie! Tylko życzliwej pomocy bratniego DZIENNIKA ŻOŁNIERZA — zawdzięczamy możność wydania numeru w bieżącym tygodniu. Przepraszamy Czytelników za zwłokę. Brakujący numer styczniowy uzupełnimy w następnym miesiącu.

REDAKCJA

SKRZYDLA — WINGS

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The Polish Exhibition in Blairgowrie gives us the opportunity to publish several pages in English about Poland's position in Central Europe. The first of these articles is a condensation of an interview of a prominent British journalist, VALENTINE HEYWOOD, with the Polish Foreign Minister, Count Edward Raczyński, as published in THE SUNDAY TIMES of the 11th January, 1942. The following one is condensed from JERZY PONIKIEWSKI'S description of POLAND'S GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION IN EUROPE in the book "POLAND — NEW YORK, 1939." The English translation is by Mrs KRYSTYNA ROTHERT. We dare hope that those pages may be of some use to the visitors of the Exhibition.

"Co Slychac,"
Polish Weekly Digest.

The Future of Central Europe

"The disturbance of the European balance, arising out of the enormous numerical and material preponderance of a unified aggressive and predatory race over their individually and collectively weaker neighbours," was according to the interview with the Polish Foreign Minister publshed in the "Sunday Times,"* a fundamental cause of this war. The rebuilding of the European continent after this war is rendered much more difficult by the temporary eclipse of France as a great power. Russia, though sufficiently tough and persevering in defence, is less able to take action outside her own borders. Being far removed from the centre of Europe and absorbed as much by Asiatic as by European problems, she cannot take France's place in maintaining the balance in Europe. It is therefore necessary to create a new centre of power which would be sufficiently strong and sound to play an adequate part in preventing hegemony and oppression and forwarding economic development. This can be done and it is necessary to take advantage of the so-called Third Europe, the area situated between Germany and Russia and stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic, Aegean and Black Sea. Poland occupies a key position in Europe. Her very existence as an independant state is the guarantee of the independence of the Scandinavian and Baltic States in the north and of the Danubian group in the south, as it was proved by the events after her defeat in 1939. Poland is ready to play this role, but she expects that there will be means available to enable her to perform such a part. At first she will have to be assured of a strong and secure frontier on the Baltic with adequate protection against a mortal encirclement from the region of East Prussia. Secondly, she needs economic assistance in her effort to raise her economic potential to such extent that she may be able to defend herself. This economic help will certainly be more justified than the vast credits advanced to Germany after the last war.

The keystone of this plan is the agreement reached by General Sikorski with Russia. The restored Polish-Russian frontier will be free of tension and Poland would be a useful barrier to her eastern neighbour against German aggression. Poland would be a member of the "bloc," which will have other partners. The first and foremost stage was the laying of sound foundations for a Polish Czecho-

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* Condensed from "The Sunday Times," 11th January, 1942. "The Key Position of Poland," interview by Valentine Heywood, with Count Raczynski, Polish Foreign Minister.

slovak Confederation.† Such a Confederation will become immediately an important factor in the European balance, thanks to its numerical strength, economic development and geographical position. And it will become a centre of attraction for other nations from north and south. The new "bloc" may extend from Lithuania through Poland and Czechoslovakia to the Balkan group of States. Both sides, the northern and southern, may be formed into two federal unions which would complete each other politically and economically. Thus they will be a new and important factor in maintaining the peaceful and prosperous development of the European continent.

† A new arrangement between the two Governments, stressing out main lines of the Confederation of the two States was already reached after Mr Heywood's interview with the Polish Foreign Minister.—Ed.

Poland's Position in Europe

1. POLITICAL OUTLOOK.

The Polish territory is situated in the very centre of the continent of Europe. If lines be drawn from the farthest points in Europe (in the north, south, west and east), then they would meet in Poland, somewhere near Warsaw. These points are: Cape St. Laurence in Portugal, the southern coast of Crete, the eastern slopes of the Ural and the North Cape in Norway.

This central position on a continent which has the most complicated pattern of all the other continents of the world, is of great international importance. The Polish territory is a sort of link in the Central European area. This area forms a bridge between 1,351,000 sq.m. of Western Europe and 1,814,000 sq.m. of Eastern Europe.

On this bridge the Polish territory occupies about one-quarter of the whole area. In 1939 the surface of Poland was about 150,000 sq.m. In the eleventh century Poland was nearly as big and she went on increasing her territory until in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries she reached the figure of 420,000 sq. miles.

In spite of frequent changes in her size and even in the times of temporary foreign occupation, Poland had always the same very definite part to play on the continent of Europe. Her geographical, or as they say now, her geopolitical position allotted it to her notwithstanding changes in her boundaries. These were changing according either to the shifting of political thought, which was interested in turn in the west, east, north or south, or else to external factors, which were compelling Poland to withdraw from some of her territories.

But, when one studies the pattern of Polish boundaries in various historical periods, one finds that they *always* formed themselves round a fixed and *never changing* axis, which following the rivers Wista, San and Dniestre links the Baltic with the Black Sea. Based on this *fixed* axis the Polish territory or the sphere of Polish influence included for centuries an area, which in the west was bound by the river Oder and in the east by the rivers Dvina and Dnieper. Within this frame a specific political, economic and cultural structure was forming itself. Its main feature lay in its bridge-like quality between the West and the East.

It is interesting to note that the Polish penetration in both directions stopped usually at the rivers mentioned above. It is thought generally that this was due to the fact that neither the Oder has any big affluents from the West nor have the Dvina and the Dnieper from the East. And so in those times when the rivers traced the lines of territorial and influential expansions, this fact played a decisive part in the direction and scope of Poland's aims.

The Polish penetrations were usually following the course of the rivers that branched from the main axis formed by the Wista (Vistula). In the West they reached the Oder by way of the river Warta and beyond, following a south-westerly direction along the River Rissa, they reached Luzyce (the Upper Saxony of to-day) and Moravia. In the East they reached the Black Sea, the Dnieper and the Dvina through the Rivers Dniester, Frypec and Prut. It would seem that in the lowlands, which form the main part of the Polish territory, there would have been other means of communication as well. But all the historic evidence points to the fact that all the oldest trade routes always followed the rivers. In the borderland these routes continued following the neighbouring water systems. Thus it was through Poland that in the early Middle Ages ran the " Amber Route " connecting the Baltic with the Black Sea, the " Tartar Route " and the " Black Route " that ran to the east of the Vistula towards the Dnieper, and in the West there were other roads from the Vistula towards Nurenberg and the Adriatic. The main points on these great international trade routes were the following towns, all lying on the Vistula: Cracow, Szczucin, Sandomierz, Plock, Chelm, Torun (Thorn) and Gdansk (Danzig).

Poland was the binding tie of communication in Central Europe.

Later on this early mediæval system of communication has been considerably developed. Roads from Paris and from Flanders to Kieff or to Genuese colonies on the Black Sea crossed in Poland the road which came from the north from Moscow and Novogorod, the eastern ambassador of the Baltic Hanse. Other roads met leading from Vyborg on the Swedish island of Gotland to the Czech and Hungarian valleys beyond the Carpathians on the Moldau, the Danube and the Wag. Through Poland, finally, passed the great " Amber Route " connecting the Baltic with the Mediterranean.

Along these routes there grew up settlements and towns. Many have now sunk into oblivion, but many have lasted till the present day, bearing witness by their character and architecture to the importance they once had. The towns—at first mainly fortresses and strongholds—gradually acquired the features of economic and cultural centres. As economic life became more active, schools grew up, which became eminent in Europe by virtue of the boldness of creative knowledge well symbolised by Mikolaj Kopernik.

That key position of the Polish territory made itself felt also in the eighteenth century when the political importance of Poland in Europe has been gradually decreasing owing to the growing influence of Prussia and Russia. Both these states tried their best first to acquire influence over Poland and then her territories. At the end of the eighteenth century, when the Prussian army occupies temporarily Warsaw the Germans publish several books pointing out the importance of taking possession of the Vistula. They all unanimously declare that "the most important line of communication on the continent of Europe—the Vistula" is now in German hands. Prussia had further plans. They were directed along the old historic trade routes, which ran south-easterly to the Black Sea and on to the Near East. These plans came to life again on the eve of the Great War. The seemingly natural - for - Germany route along the Danube was still too difficult from the political as well as from the technical point of view. Before 1914 Germany, in her plans for using this route, met always with a resistance from the part of Holsburg monarchs who claimed that they alone had rights to the Danubian basin and the Balkans. Hence the opinion in Berlin that the Germans must hold the Vistula, that " most important route in Europe," which otherwise threatened their imperialistic ambitions.

The invention of an artificial and pseudohistorical argumentation about the " rights " to the lands of the Vistula proved a failure. They had to be got by force. In 1915-1917 it seemed as though the Vistula

would come permanently into the sphere of German influence. But a year later this hope proved vain: Poland, having retaken possession of the lands she has had for centuries, began to organise them according to her old tradition. Again—as in other times—the line of the Vistula becomes the axis round which gathers the Polish territory. And again reappears the traditional tendency of reaching an understanding with these nations, which after the first World War began to lead an individual political life.

The axis: the Baltic—the Black Sea, is once more taking shape.

Politically it is becoming the basis of a harmonious collaboration between the peoples of Central Europe. Economically it represents a modern way of communication equipped with various types of modern means of transport. Culturally it forms a bridge between such different worlds as those of North-Western and South-Eastern Europe.

It is obvious that in the modern circumstances of complicated and variegated social, economic and political structures the re-creation of the old primitive "Amber Route" was not possible. Nevertheless, the example of many most up-to-date systems of transit and communication show that when they are based on waterways, then they are much superior to those based on rail or road traffic. It is this last consideration that made Germany build a big internal canal which gave her a new artificial system of communication spreading across her territory. Later, the same idea dictated the slogan: "the line Rhine-Main-Danube," which in the first period of the Nazi imperialism was the basis for taking hold of the old Habsburgian line of expansion extending in the south-easterly direction. Moreover, the line Rhine-Main-Danube became later on the geopolitical "axis" of the New Order, which the Germans wanted to impose upon Europe.

This axis has now become a rather internal affair. In relation to the occupied or controlled territories the line Rhine-Main-Danube is too eccentric: it almost forms their western boundary.

In the middle of this area their flows the Vistula. By a system of canals it links up with the West and with the East, now occupied by Germany, by various branchings and affluents.

Again the line running from the Baltic to the Black Sea has become the mainspring of the German aspirations. The importance and meaning of this line, so well taken care of by Poland, has been proved once more.

During the twenty years that separated the two World Wars Poland began first the reconstruction of all that has been destroyed and then the rebuilding of her internal organisation, which she based on a many years' economic plan.

This plan included the traditional line linking the Baltic with the Black Sea as the main axis of the future economic organisation.

Along this line the construction of several industrial centres has been planned and put into execution. Next, others have been added to, so that they might link with other neighbouring economic organisms.

It is in this spirit that Poland set herself to use to the fullest every mile of her sea-coast. Before 1939 she had only about 90 miles of the coast. But this narrow strip gave her access to the international naval routes. She reached them either through the straits of the two Sounds and the Skagerrak, or through the Keil Canal. There was a third way: the Swedish Gota Canal. True, the canal, built over a hundred years ago, was in need of improvements and reconstruction. But it is worth remembering that during the last war it was often used for transports to the Baltic area. They escaped thus the British control in the Danish straits. Poland was considering the possibility of this outlet as she was bound to the Scandinavian Peninsula by many traditional ties of mutual collaboration and by the perspective of further development of economic relations.

During the twenty years of peace there also appeared new possibilities in the South. The Turkish coast of the Black Sea, hitherto lifeless, began to show increasing signs of animation in the years before the outbreak of the present war. The seaport of Bamsun together with the coastal region of Eragli and Zanguldak became vital centres of industry connected with the Near East by series of modern means of communication. Owing to these new centres and lines of communication, the route linking the Baltic with the Black Sea has been, as it were, lengthened.

From the North-West, from Great Britain through the Scandinavian Peninsula, the Baltic, the Vistula, along the rivers San and Dniester, cutting across the Black Sea, a route was shaping itself that was based on historic tradition. It was perhaps the beginning of a new road between Great Britain and Bagdad.

This new geopolitical "axis," competing, as it did, effectively with the German efforts for creating "an axis Rhine-Main-Danube," met with increasing understanding and was taking more and more distinct shape, born not from theoretical conceptions, but from sound political as well as economic calculations.

2. STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

Generally speaking, the strategic position of the Polish territory was always a complicated one.

In Central Europe the Polish territory occupies a space almost open in the east and in the west. It was only in the south that the ridge of the Carpathians provided a cover in the old times. It offered only the slightest difficulty to the modern armies in the September campaign of 1939.

Other Central European countries, i.e., Scandinavia in the north, the Balkans in the south and the Danubian countries could always use their natural defences as bases for their defence systems. But the present war has greatly undermined the very value of these obstacles by being primarily a war of movement, of concentric attacks on narrow sectors and of deep outflanking thrusts. These new forms of warfare have overthrown the belief that mountains constitute a serious strategic obstacle. Ample proof of their weakness was provided not only in the Carpathians, but also in Norway and, above all, in southern Yugoslavia and in Greece, where neither the Vardar Valley nor the Struma Valley could hold the enemy for more than a mere few days.

The mountains have lost their defensive value in the present war —just as the rivers did in the previous one.

If there had ever been a clearly formulated principle about the defensive value of the mountains, the rivers and the space, then it seems, that only space has still retained this value.

The Central European countries often tried to create such a space by means of federations, always prompted and directed by Poland. These federations included, e.g., in the fifteenth century Poland and Lithuania, in the beginning of the sixteenth century, Poland, Bohemia and Hungary, bound together at the time by a dynastic union. The sixteenth century witnessed more of these federal plans, which reached much farther, including in their scope Scandinavia and even Russia.

Such wedges formed in consequence some genuine basis of space, which would make an effective attack on Central Europe by her neighbours an impossible one.

The battle of Grunwald is a symbol of these consequences; Poland and Lithuania bound together by common interests not only achieved a military success, but also checked for a long time the Prussian penetration to the east.

Two problems were always attached to the task of organising the space in Central Europe. One was concerning the size of such a space, the other its boundaries.

The Germans always tried to get hold of such strategic positions as

would enable them to attack Central Europe.

Their efforts date back to the tenth century and they were trying to establish themselves in Silesian and in Pomerania in order to drive, as it were, a wedge into the territories of Central Europe. This idea took various shapes in various historical periods—but at the root it remained unchanged throughout the times of Bismarck and Wilhelm II. as well as in the recent times of the II. and III. Reich. The Versailles phase seemed to announce the pushing back of Germans to the west and the liquidation of the German eastern outposts. But this process has not been carried to its end. It has been thought that the encirclement of these wedges by Poland and Czechoslovakia in the south and by Poland and the Baltic States in the north would neutralise their importance.

The years 1938-1939 proved that these expectations were vain.

The southern wedge has been enlarged by the addition of Czechoslovakia. In the northern wedge there remains only one obstacle very slight for modern strategics, i.e., the Polish Pomerania. The Baltic States were completely neutralised by the competition on their territories between Russia and Germany.

In these circumstances Central Europe—and within her the Polish territory—found themselves confronted with (a) the breaking up of the protecting space; (b) deep German wedges.

The same position is found again in 1940, when Germany established herself in Rumania and Hungary and then, by means of the Bulgarian wedge rounds up the shattering of the Balkans — that southern flank of Central Europe.

The general conclusions from all these considerations drawn from historic as well as from quite recent events are and always have been that Central Europe should be bound together more closely and should not tolerate wedges in the form of foreign sovereign areas.

Otherwise the events, which so often turned Central Europe — and particularly Poland — into a raging battlefield, will repeat themselves continuously.

Not one of the great continental wars has left this space in peace. It is there that the present war began, just as the previous one did. To-day, in the light of many official German declarations, it is clear that it would have made no difference whether Poland had been more or less yielding in 1939 — the World War would have broken out in any case. Danzig and the Polish Pomerania were not the *cause* of the war, but only its *beginning*.

The conquest of Central Europe, and first of all of its tie — the Polish territory — constituted the first necessary step towards other, larger actions. And just as in 1914-1918 the German Reich pushed Russia back to the East in order to acquire freedom of movement in the West, so in 1939 Central Europe was broken up before any operations started in the West.

Thus, from the continental point of view, Central Europe constitutes a flank that must be taken into consideration in all strategic conceptions. This flank possessed considerable strength for many centuries. In the twenty years between the two wars the permanent features of this flank were visible after the Treaty of Versailles. They are visible even now, when new ties, e.g. the agreements that Poland has made with the neighbouring countries, allow to forecast a future collaboration for the consolidation of this territory.

Economic Outlook

In 1921, almost immediately after she had recovered her independence, Poland settled down to repair the destructions and to bind together her economic organs broken up into three parts during over 120 years of foreign occupation.

The conditions of work were very difficult as the war in the East went on without stopping till 1921 and often shifted across Polish territory. Nevertheless the task of reconstruction has been carried out almost entirely. The next problem was that of the rebuilding of the economic life.

This effort, based as it was in the historic tradition of Polish economic life, was directed mainly towards the adaptation of Poland's economy to her vital internal interests and towards the adaptation of the whole structure of her life to that of her neighbours. For it was thought generally that in the present times the lasting qualities of political systems depend largely on the right solution of the economic problems.

What were the economic possibilities in Central Europe that were open to Poland?

In the study of the economic problem the last should be divided into three separate parts:

a—the question of food supply.

b— „ „ „ raw materials.

c—the industrial question.

As far as food supply was concerned Central Europe was self-sufficient. The Scandinavian States, which alone showed some deficit in this respect, could always satisfy their demands from the surplus produced by other countries of the Central European area. The other countries like Poland, the Baltic States or the Danubian States had always considerable surplus in foodstuffs. Blocks of agricultural countries and efforts for wider economic agreements in 1930-1936 tried to solve this problem as well as the question of raw materials and industry. In this last resort Central Europe was in need of some general organisation as she had inherent all the possibilities for a positive solution of such a problem. The last economic problem was the one of population. The majority of Central European countries showed great dynamics in the increase of their population, chiefly among the peasants. In many countries a one-sided agricultural structure of national economy began to cause—often imperceptibly—unemployment in the countryside. This phenomena, unknown in Western Europe, took more and more threatening shape as it embraced an ever increasing number of people. Before the war it reached in Central Europe the figure of several millions, who could not emigrate to other continents owing to the restrictions imposed upon the emigration quota by the overseas countries.

Such is the background of the growing tendencies to increase the scope of one's own industrial life. These tendencies are contemporary to the autarchical currents of thought that are beginning to sweep over Europe. The uncertainty of the international situation, which calls for an increased "war preparedness" not only in the strictly military sense of the word, but also in its economic implications, has a quickening effect on the industrialisation of certain countries.

The study of the figures of the increased industrial production in individual countries proves this sufficiently. In Greece, e.g., the increase is of more than 100 per cent., the same applies to Hungary. The figures relate to the last four years. This period is marked in Central Europe not only by the gradual industrial development, but also in the increase of the exploitation of the natural resources. Areas, which before the war had little or no importance as far as raw materials were concerned, have

since become rich sources of these materials.


In Central Europe the following regions possessing raw materials sought for by war as well as peace economy are to be found:—

1 The North.	**2 The South.**
a. Iron ore.	a. Bauxite.
b. Nickel.	b. Copper.
c. Cellulose.	c. Chromium.
d. Flax.	d. M a n g a n ese ore, lead and zinc.
	e. Pyrites.
	f. Oil.
	g. Hemp.

Poland was situated between these two regions and possessed iron ores, pyrites, zinc, lead, phosphories and, above, all, rich sources of kinetic energy: coal, oil, crude gas/natural/and great possibilities for increased use of water as a source of electricity.

The geographically central position of Poland in Central Europe thus acquired a new economic value in the consolidation of this area. Another important point—the result of her geographical position—consisted in her transit possibilities. A third was a great labour market growing every year with the increase in the population. The density of population, which in some regions reached the figure of 500 per 1 sq.m., averaged 233 per 1 sq.m. and was equal to the density of the most industrialised countries. One of the characteristic feautre of the Polish nation was its youth as compared with the average age of other Europen nations. About 76 per c. of the population were not over 40 years old.

Those three assets: transit, natural sources of kinetic energy and a large labour market together with various raw materials for auxiliary in-




dustries, gave Poland the opportunity of playing the part of an economic "tie" in the organisation of Central Europe. All the plans for the economic reconstruction of the country followed this "tie" conception. It began first with the building of a harbour in Gdynia and with changes in the system of the railways (the construction of a coal line Silesia-the Baltic). It went on with the construction of an idustrial area situated in the centre of the country and called "Central Industrial Area."

The site of this area was chosen according to the part played by Poland in the whole economic system of Central Europe. It lay on the Vistula, in that central part of her course, where the river San joins her. This river was to be connected by a canal with the Dniester, the i.e. which is leading to the Black Sea. Thus situated the "Central Industrial Area" formed the strongest industrial centre on the great trade and transit route from the Baltic to the Black Sea. It was meant to supply not only to the internal demands, but also to the demands of this great route. It was meant to be the main centre for the refining of the raw materials flowing in from north and south.

This place, so rightly chosen from the international point of view, also suited very well the internal economic structure of Poland. It was situated almost in the middle of the various sources of the national raw materials necessary for auxiliary industries and it was backed, as it were, by a region rich in sources of motive energy. It was also lying in the most thickly populated area. This industrial centre has began to materialise in 1936. Besides great modern ironworks "Stalowa Wola" there rise various industrial plants and foundries in Ostrowiec and Starachowice are being enlarged. Round these basic plants new plants of auxiliary industries are rising and in the first period one million men are employed in the building industry, the building of roads and railways, at regulating rivers and laying of gaspipes.

Planned industrialized belts in the center and east of Poland.



☐ Central Industrial District.
▨ Planned industrialized regions.

The first phase of this gigantic work —for which there is no similar in Central Europe—was supposed to end in 1941-42. The next phase was to base itself on the new industrial area and to activate the economic life of other districts.

What were to be the consequences of such large scale action?

They were very positive for the internal market. In the Economic system of Central Europe they made Poland not only a geographical but an economic tie as well. For the international markets they meant a new and considerable buyer of high quality industial articles and of colonial raw materials.

And here again we see the idea of lengthening the route Baltic-Black Sea to Great Britain via Scandinavia or to the south via Turkey.

The reconstruction of Poland—interrupted by the war—followed the same line as the organising principles of Central Europe, which aimed at the consolidation of the whole Central European area together with full collaboration with the great international markets.

ROZBIOR JUGOSLAWII

W jednym z poprzednich numerów), podaliśmy na podstawie dwutygodnika "Free Europe" zmiany granic, wprowadzone po podbiciu Jugosławii przez Niemców. obecnie streszczamy obszerniejsze opracowanie rozbioru tego nieszczęśliwego kraju, na podstawie THE BULLETIN OF INTERNATIONAL NEWS. Wiadomości te mogą być ciekawe w obecnej chwili, gdy mimo wszelkich represji okupanta, walka na froncie bałkańskim trwa ciągle i powstańcy wiążą w ten sposób wcale poważne siły niemieckie.**)*

Po okupowaniu Grecji i Jugosławii przez Niemców i postępujących za nimi Włochów, do podziału łupów zgłosiły się dwa dalsze państwa : Węgry i Bułgaria. Lwia część przypadła Włochom, które dostały część Słowenii, upragnione wybrzeże dalmackie i dominujący wpływ — przynajmniej w teorii — w "Wielkiej Chorwacji" i w Czarnogórze. Niemcy nie posunęły się po za rzekę Sawę z wyjątkiem zaanektowanej przez się części Słowenii, chociaż okupują Serbię, Banat jugosłowiański i kluczowe punkty w Chorwacji. Węgry zagrabiły bogate obwody Baczka i Barania pomiędzy Dunajem i Cisą oraz mniejsze skrawki nad Murą. Bułgarzy dorwali się wschodniej Serbii, oraz niemal całej serbskiej Macedonii. Włochy uczestniczyły jeszcze dodatkowo w rozbiorze anektując dla Albanii południowe obwody Serbii i Czarnogóry, a Rumuni dostali jedynie drobny obszar naprzeciwko Żelaznych Wrót na południowym brzegu Dunaju.

Z Jugosławii pozostały jeszcze trzy "państwa" : Chorwacja, obejmująca nie tylko właściwe ziemie chorwackie ale nadto całą dawną Bośnię i Hercegowinę i część Dalmacji; znacznie okrojona Serbia i Czarnogóra. W tych trzech państwach opór przeciwko niemieckim i włoskim okupan-

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*) *patrz "Co Słychać" nr* 46 *str.* 1063 *"ROZBIÓR JUGOSŁAWII".*

**) *THE DIVISION OF THE SPOILS IN JUGOSLAVIA by M. B. w nr 26 tom XŁIII str. 2008 i nr 1 tom XIX str. 3 THE BULLETIN OF INTERNATIONAL NEWS.*

tom nie tylko nie maleje, lecz odwrotnie — stale wzrasta. Chorwacja przeszła już od upadku Jugosławii licząc, dość niezwykłe przemiany polityczne. Oto zaraz po wkroczeniu wojsk niemieckich w dniu 10. kwietnia 1941. wygłosił przemówienie radiowe gen. Kwaternik, jako pełniący obowiązki głowy państwa, zaznaczając, że Chorwacja jest "wolna i niepodległa". Już następnego dnia przybył z Włoch do Belgradu Ante Pavelic, terotysta chorwacki i ogłosił się wodzem państwa chorwackiego ("poglavnik"). Sformowany nowy rząd chorwacki miał w swym składzie głównie tylko współtowarzyszy Pavelica z terorystycznej organizacji Ustaszi. Granice z Niemcami uregulowała umowa podpisana w Zagrzebiu (13.V.41.), stosunki z Włochami ustalono w dwóch umowach podpisanych w Rzymie (18.V.41.). Te traktaty oddały nowoutworzone państwo pod zupełną kontrolę i kuratelę Włoch, które nawet miały prowadzić jego sprawy zagraniczne, wojskowe i gospodarcze. Operetkowe proklamowanie królem chorwackim ks. Spoleto, nie wpłynęło wcale na układ stosunków. Serbię okrojono do granic z przed 1914. a nawet z przed 1912 r. Naprzeciw Belgradu, pod pretekstem przynależności do wolnej Chorwacji, leży dawna dzielnica serbskiej stolicy Zemun, teraz okupowana przez garnizon niemiecki. Rząd gen. Nedicza jest zdaje się całkiem bezsilny wobec okupantów. Wreszcie Czarnogóra, która obecnie "odzyskała" dzięki Włochom niepodległość, jest całkowicie pod włoską kontrolą. Italia ma w Czarnogórze Komisarza Cywilnego, a uchwała o wprowadzeniu monarchii powierzała zarazem regencję królowi włoskiemu. Banat jugosłowiański, który rzekomo ma mieć osobny statut, był przez jakiś czas w rękach rumuńskich, ale obecnie jest pod okupacją Niemców, którzy wprowadzili specjalne zarządzenia, "zapewniające grupie niemieckiej wpływ polityczny, odpowiadający jej wielkości i znaczeniu".

Trudno jest jeszcze w obecnej chwili zdać sobie sprawę z tego jak dalece te nowe zarządzenia rozbiorowe wpłynęły na faktyczny stan rzeczy na Bałkanach. I tak np. w/g wiadomości nadchodzących z Włoch (z 11.XI.41) rząd Pavelica jest zupełnie bezsilny i ledwie się trzyma. Włosi zdaje się tylko dzięki okupacyjnej armii niemieckiej są panami Jugosławii i sami nie byliby w stanie opanować sytuacji w kraju. Prawosławni Serbowie, katolicy chorwaccy, Mahometanie z Czarnogóry i Katolicy słoweńscy, wszystkie te narodowości, wojujące ze sobą za czasów niepodległości są dzisiaj więcej niż kiedykolwiek zespolone przeciwko najeźdźcom. Samo zaś ukształtowanie pionowe kraju wcale nie ułatwia utrzymania w karbach ludności. W niedostępnych górach żołnierze mogą przez dłuższy czas jeśli nie zwalczać Niemców i Włochów, to w każdym razie wyczekiwać lepszego jutra.

Bułgarska okupacja nie jest łagodniejsza. Za podstawową datę przyjęto tutaj rok 1912. Wszystkich Serbów, którzy bądź to przybyli do okupowanej obecnie przez Bułgarów Macedonii jugosłowiańskiej po tym roku, bądź też urodzili się tam, zostali wysiedleni. Prześladowanie objęło także i Turków. Na czele bułgarskiej administracji stanął Iwan Michajłow, dawny przewodniczący I. M. R. O., rewolucyjnej partii macedońskiej, który przebywał w Sofii na wygnaniu.

Węgrzy przeprowadzili masowe egzekucje Serbów i wysiedlili z zagarniętych przez się prowincji ponad 70,000 mieszkańców. W Słowenii Niemcy starają się wytępić mieszkańców. Komisarzem Rzeszy został austriacki hitlerowiec, który zarządził konfiskatę całego majątku obywateli i osób prawnych państwa jugosłowiańskiego (dn. 2.V.1941) a następnie upoważnił organizację mniejszości niemieckiej do przejęcia tego majątku na własność. Niemcy stosują tutaj masowe deportacje ludności. Księży aresztowano. We wrześniu oceniano liczbę wysiedlonych do Chorwacji i Serbii na 28,000, zesłanych na pracę w Niemczech na 10,000 a uciekinierów, którzy schronili się do Lublany, gdzie Włosi byli nieco łagodniejsi na 8,000 ludzi. W czasie zamieszek powstałych na tle oporu chłopów przeciwko konfiskatom, Niemcy zastosowali wypróbowany już poprzednio w innych krajach sposób rozstrzeliwania 10 Słoweńców za jednego Niemca.

W Chorwacji narzędziem teroru była milicja, utworzona z Ustaszich (terorystycznej organizacji Pavelica). Niemieckie wojska okupacyjne przyglądały się bezczynnie pogromom, urządzanym przez milicjantów wśród ludności serbskiej. Dopiero gdy wybuchły rozruchy i groziło rozsprzężenie całej administracji, okupanci usunęli milicję i oddali utrzymanie porządku niemieckiej żandarmerii wojskowej. T. zw. ustawa o reformie rolnej z dnia 6. maja 1941. usankcjonowała wywłaszczenie Serbów i wysiedlanie ich z granic kraju. W dniu 10. listopada ub. r. Niemcy aresztowali z Zagrzebiu 1500 osób z czego rozstrzelali 200 jako represję za zabicie trzech Niemców. Na podstawie porozumienia pomiędzy Rzeszą a rządem chorwackim 52,000 Chorwatów wywieziono na roboty do Niemiec.

Najgorsze prześladowania panują jednak we właściwej Serbii. W Belgradzie ogłoszono np. 28. lipca stan oblężenia i rozstrzelano jednego tylko dnia 480 osób. W Kragujevac za zabicie 26 żołnierzy niemieckich rozstrzelano 2,300 ludności cywilnej, w czym także chłopców 16 i 17 letnich. We wrześniu we więzieniu belgradzkim trzymano 1500 zakładników serbskich i żydowskich i za zabicie jednego Niemca rozstrzeliwuje się bez wyboru pięćdziesięciu z nich.


Włoska okupacja w Słowenii była stosunkowo łagodna, natomiast w Czarnogórze były i są gwałtowne represje i egzekucje, bo kraj ciągle jeszcze wre i walczy. Nie bez powodu wyraził się gen. Nedić w swej proklamacji z dnia 14.IX.1941, gdy wzywał ludność serbską do zaprzestania oporu przeciwko Niemcom, że w przeciwnym razie "ekspedycja karna zamieni Serbię w takie ruiny i zgliszcza, jakie są dzisiaj w Czarnogórze".

Nie ma dokładnych informacji stwierdzających, które części kraju są okupowane przez wojsko. Źródła tureckie oceniają niemieckie siły na 7 — 10 dywizji. Wojska włoskie były w Chorwacji, Czarnogórze i Dalmacji. Jednak armia jugosłowiańska nie została włościwie rozbita ale tylko rozproszona, to też nawet większe oddziały zaszyły się w górach i lasach i walczą jeszcze do dzisiaj. Podobno Niemcy ograniczają swą okupację do utworzenia garnizonów w miastach ważniejszych i bezpieczniejszych i nie próbują nawet opanować całego kraju.




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